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Science  in  American  Society 
A Generation of Historical Debate 
By  Charles Rosenberg* 
T  WENTY  YEARS AGO, the place of science in American society did not 
really constitute a problem for historians; within the larger discipline of 
history it attracted  only a handful  of devotees-most  of them practitioners  of a 
still unfashionable  social or institutional  history. Within  the rather  different  con- 
fines of a still newly fledged history of science, scholars concerned with the 
development of science in America occupied a marginal  place-their  very con- 
cern with matters  national  and social dictating  a comparatively  low status. If the 
ultimate structures of  science  were intellectual, the confining of  scholarship 
within national  boundaries  seemed arbitrary,  perhaps  justified occasionally by a 
desire to clarify the circumstances  of particularly  significant  innovations  but oth- 
erwise inconsistent with the necessarily international  structure  of knowledge it- 
self. General historians  who concerned themselves with science in America  felt 
similarly isolated from the mainstream  of their particular  discipline, where the 
big questions were still political:  causation  of the American  Revolution  and Civil 
War, the nature of Progressivism  and Jacksonian  Democracy, the failure of Re- 
construction. 
The would-be student of science in America could only feel defensive as he- 
there were not many shes-contemplated  the existing canon of significance.  The 
sociologists and political scientists who interested  themselves in the field seemed 
weak allies in confronting  a literature  dominated  by centuries before the nine- 
teenth and problems largely intellectual. Moreover, the Americanists' stock of 
empirical  knowledge was thin and skewed toward  the eighteenth  and early nine- 
teenth centuries, a period, ironically, when the place of North America in the 
world of learning  was as marginal  intellectually  in relation-to the metropolis as 
it was geographically.  Equally limiting  was a discursive and unquestioning  style; 
the study of American science was characterized  by much description  and pre- 
cious little analysis. It was still possible to announce with the enthusiasm of 
novelty that connections did indeed exist between society and the internal  world 
of  science,  as  though that constituted in itself a meaningful statement. The 
only well-established tradition of formal social analysis that had even fitfully 
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dressed  such  matters-the  Marxist-hardly  existed  as an option  in 1962; it was 
banished  from the American  academic  scene  by politics  and, perhaps more im- 
portantly, by a pervasive  atheoretical  and empirical style of historical discourse. 
To  most  general  historians,  the  past  role  of  science  and technology  was  self- 
evident;  almost  all,  including  the  neo-Marxist,  were  whigs  and  modernizers 
without  being  aware  of  it.  Like  the  gentleman  who  discovered  to  his  surprise 
that  he  had  been  speaking  prose  for  years,  it  was  the  common  sense  of  the 
matter. Historians  simply assumed  that science  had played a direct, central,  and 
unquestioned  role in promoting social change in the West.  And this cultural evo- 
lution  was  as  implicitly  beneficent  as  it  was  inevitable;  a positive  moral tone 
surrounded  the  accomplishments  of  man's  mind.  The  past  two  decades  have 
made it difficult  to  sustain  this point of view;  change  may still be unavoidable, 
but its  shape  is unpredictable  and it no longer seems  necessarily  benevolent. 
Inevitable as these  skeptical trends may appear in retrospect,  they were hardly 
apparent a generation  ago.  When,  as  a beginner,  I first tried to  take  stock  of 
the field in  1963, I expected  other developments  to reshape the historical  study 
of science  in America.1 It seemed  clear that the history of science  discipline was 
divided  in practice  between  an internalist majority and an externalist  minority; 
while  no one  defended  the logic  of this alignment,  it nevertheless  described  an 
undeniable  reality.  The  "big  problem"  seemed,  as  I  saw  it,  to  reside  in  the 
difficulty of finding an approach that would soften the rigidity of this intractable, 
yet  logically  indefensible  situation. 
In  the  past  generation  this  picture  has  shifted  dramatically.  Although  a  mi- 
nority of  enthusiasts  feel  that they  have  discovered  an appropriate method  for 
investigating  such  questions,  we  can hardly be said to have  solved  the problem 
of  relating  internal  and  external  approaches;  yet  to  many  of  those  who  have 
contributed  to the field  in the past two  decades  it must seem  like an irrelevant 
and even  provincial  matter-a  spat between  two  equally  obscurantist  wings  of 
a  desiccated  scholarship.  The  controversy  between  internalist  and  externalist 
has  been  overtaken  by  history  itself.  New  motivations  have  attracted  a  new 
breed of practitioner; and to a good  many such,  the role of  science-and  espe- 
cially  its  applied  aspects-is  not  simply  a  subject  for  academic  inquiry,  but  a 
scandalously  neglected  field  for  moral and political  revelation.  A  host  of  such 
critics  have  begun  to  study  the  place  of  science,  medicine,  and technology  in 
American  society,  and only  a minority feel  a primary loyalty  to  the  history  of 
science  as a discipline.  Many do not even think of themselves  as historians.  This 
is a generation bounded by Silent Spring and Three Mile Island; it is a generation 
during which  Michel  Foucault  has replaced  Robert Merton as our most  widely 
influential sociologist  of knowledge;2 it is a generation that lived  through a war 
l Charles  Rosenberg,  "On  the  Study  of  American  Biology  and Medicine:  Some  Justifications," 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine,  1964, 38:364-376  (delivered at the annual meeting of the History 
of  Science  Society,  December  1963). 
2 Recent  years  have  seen  an efflorescence  of  Foucault  exegesis;  for guidance  in this  literature, 
see  Hubert L.  Dreyfus  and Paul Rabinow,  Michel  Foucault:  Beyond  Structuralism and Hermeneu- 
tics  (Chicago:  Univ.  Chicago  Press,  1982); and Charles  C.  Lemert  and Garth Gillan,  Michel  Fou- 
cault:  Social  Theory as  Transgression  (New  York: Columbia Univ.  Press,  1982). What seems  par- 
ticularly clear in evaluating  reactions  to  Foucault  is that his extraordinary political and intellectual 
influence  is  based  to  a  good  extent  on  his  delegitimation  of  the  knowledge  and  authority  of  the 
purveyors  and  invokers  of  the  human  sciences.  The  contrast  with  the  form  and  assumptions  of 
Mertonian sociology  is apparent. 
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in Indo-China,  a war that juxtaposed  high technology  and a related bureaucracy 
with  a beautiful  natural setting  and the traditional ways  of  a peasant  society- 
and thus recalled a much older and morally resonant contrast between  the works 
of  God  and  those  of  man.  Perhaps  most  important,  these  have  been  decades 
during which  the  seemingly  inevitable  connection  between  knowledge  and au- 
thority  has  become  not  a necessary-and  thus  moral-response  to  complexity 
in social  structure,  but an arbitrary imposition  of  interested  control.  What had 
been  a marginal aspect  of the history  of  science  has become  a bustling field  in 
history  generally,  as  well  as  an increasingly  prominent  element  in the  eclectic 
mosaic  of interests  and motivations  that make up the history of science  in 1982. 
The development  of a critical,  and even  antagonistic,  attitude toward the past 
and present  role  of  science  in the  United  States  is  related  to  the  growth  of  a 
more  critical,  and  self-consciously  political,  spirit among  American  historians 
generally and, more specifically,  to a growth of interest in the role of knowledge 
in American  society.  To  many  such  recent  historians  of  organized  knowledge, 
the intellectual  tools  of past scholars  and administrators have become  props for 
the  maintenance  of  class,  role,  and gender  status-and  not  ever-more  refined 
approximations of a biological  or social reality. To these critics,  the variously in- 
ternalist canons  of the history of science,  technology,  and medicine were merely 
epiphenomena,  reflecting  the  pretensions  of  a  learned  community  that  chose 
to  hold  itself  above  the  social  context  and consequences  of  its  acts.  Not  sur- 
prisingly,  this revisionist  spirit has already begun to provoke  a backlash  of hos- 
tile  counterrevisionism;  we  have  recently  heard anxious  lamentations  over  the 
emergence  of a history of science  without science,  of a history of medicine with- 
out  doctors.3  Yet  this  emotionally  laden debate  so  characteristic  of today's  in- 
tellectual  climate  has in fact obscured  a rather more complex  past by polarizing 
and monolithically  conflating  critical,  left,  and externalist  positions  on the  one 
hand and internalist and socially  conservative  positions  on the other. 
During the past two  decades,  scholars  concerned  with the historical  relation- 
ship between  science  and society  in the United  States  have  been  influenced  by 
a number of approaches.  Some have been relatively ephemeral in their influence, 
others more lasting.  With the understanding that these  are not entirely exclusive 
categories,  let  me  suggest  three  trends  which  have  appealed  more  or  less 
strongly  to  historians  of  American  science  during the  past  generation.  One, 
which  seemed  especially  promising in the middle and late  1960s, reflected  con- 
temporary  sociology  of  science,  especially  its  emphasis  on  norms  and institu- 
tional  structures:  historians  seeking  to  emulate  such  sociological  work  also 
began  to  urge-and  on  occasion  to  practice-the  study  of  the  scientific  com- 
munity  in  quantitative  terms,  wherever  possible.  A  second  trend,  chronologi- 
cally  subsequent  but ultimately of wider impact among general readers,  was,  as 
I have  already  implied,  a critical  emphasis  on  the  ideological  uses  of  science; 
closely  connected  to this development  was  an increasing interest  in the history 
of the social  sciences  and especially  of their social uses.  Related to this concern 
3 [Leonard  Wilson], "Medical  History with Medicine," Journal  of the History  of Medicine, 1980, 
35:5-7; Charles  C. Gillispie  in remarks  to the A.A.A.S. as reported  by William  J. Broad, "History 
of Science Losing Its Science," Science, 1980,  207:389;  [Leonard  Wilson],  "Schizophrenia  in Learned 
Societies: Professionalism  vs. Scholarship,"  J. Hist. Med., 1981,  36:5-8; Lloyd Stevenson, "A Sec- 
ond Opinion,"  Bull. Hist. Med., 54:134-140;  Nathan  Reingold,  "Science, Scientists, and Historians 
of Science," History of Science, 1981, 19:274-283. 
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with the use of scientific and medical authority  as cultural  ideology was a desire 
to evaluate the social impact of technology, medicine, and the applied sciences. 
In retrospect it seems apparent  that the motivation for such scholarship  grew 
not so much out of concern for the community of scientific practitioners  and 
their ideas as out of a critical attitude toward the social role of that community 
and the social effects of its knowledge. A third trend in the past generation's 
study of American science has been an ever-increasing  interest in the twentieth 
century and especially in the role of big science, the foundations,  industry, and 
government  in the scientific enterprise: 
In the mid-1960s  it might well have appeared  that the concepts and tools of 
contemporary  sociology were on the point of reshaping  our understanding  of the 
scientific community  and its historical development. It was, for example, a pe- 
riod during which something called professionalization  seemed a particularly 
helpful organizational  framework.4  It was a period too when quantitative  meth- 
ods first promised to  make studies of publication, citation behavior, and re- 
cruitment  sensitive tools for anatomizing  the shape and evolutionary  pattern of 
the scientific community. Contemporary  sociology provided powerful and pres- 
tigious models; yet their overall impact has been relatively slight. Though his- 
torians of science have often cited sociological studies and generalization,  and 
on occasion have published work derived from such models, they actually em- 
ployed these tools and concepts with comparative caution. There is  no sub- 
stantial  body of monographic  work on the history of American  science strongly 
shaped by the sociology of the 1960s. This lack is particularly  striking  because 
it was a period when historians  generally  were much taken with the prestige and 
quantitative  techniques of the social sciences. It was, for example, a high point 
in the influence of behavioral  political science among students of American  po- 
litical history-an  influence which is still very much alive in today's scholarship. 
It was,  similarly, a  period when econometrically oriented economic history 
triumphed  decisively over a more traditional  institutional  approach. 
There are some conspicuous exceptions to this generalization;  it would be 
unfair  to argue that this past generation's sociology has exerted no influence at 
all over scholarship  in the history of science. The attempt  to document  and anat- 
omize the professionalization  of science in America, for example, was one such 
focus of influence. It benefited from the advantage  of seeming to be something 
both significant  in itself and useful as an indicator  of the implied  developmental 
pattern  of the scientific community;  and perhaps  most enticingly, it promised  to 
be quantitatively  measurable  through  the choice of appropriate  indicators. Pro- 
fessionalization seemed, finally, to relate the history of America's learned com- 
munity to the multifaceted yet ultimately symmetrical  development of society 
generally. Ideas about modernization,  as I have already suggested, fit unobtru- 
sively into the whiggish assumptions  so prevalent  in the history of science. The 
growth and specialization of the several scientific disciplines, like that of the 
4 George  H.  Daniels  was particularly influential in advocating  the usefulness  of this approach; see 
Daniels,  "The  Process  of  Professionalization  in  American  Science:  The  Emergent  Period,  1820- 
1860,"  Isis,  1967, 58:151-166;  Daniels,  American  Science  in the Age  of Jackson  (New  York:  Co- 
lumbia Univ.  Press,  1968). A  dozen  years  ago  I was  far more  sanguine  about  the  impact  of  con- 
temporary  sociology:  see  Charles  Rosenberg,  "On  Writing the  History  of  American  Science,"  in 
The State  of American  History,  ed.  Herbert J.  Bass  (Chicago:  Quadrangle Books,  1970), pp.  183- 
196. 
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traditional  learned professions, both reflected and helped constitute the devel- 
opment of a characteristically  modern  society. And despite a growing  skepticism 
in the past decade in regard to the usefulness of the so-called modernization 
framework, the study of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century  professional- 
ization has left behind a sediment of empirical work and a continued core of 
interest in professionalization.  It has become abundantly  clear, however, that 
some of our earlier notions of professionalization  were over-schematized and 
imprecise.5 
Let me suggest two other exceptions to my generalization  about the compar- 
atively slight impact of the empirical sociology of science on the writing of its 
history. One is the work of Joseph Ben-David, whose discipline-oriented  case 
studies have been widely cited and assimilated  by historians  of science.6 Unlike 
most of his peers in the 1960s, Ben-David was genuinely interested in specific 
historical  events-particularly, of course, the role of institutional  innovation  and 
structure in intellectual change. Though constituting at first glance a kind of 
reductionist  microeconomics  of academic careerism, Ben-David's work has had 
a lasting impact in emphasizing  the interrelationship  between career choice, the 
structure  of academic options, and intellectual  activity. Many historians  who do 
not share Ben-David's earnestly positivistic faith have nevertheless been influ- 
enced by him. 
Thomas Kuhn's  Structure of Scientific  Revolutions  constitutes  another sort of 
exception to my generalization;  in emphasizing  the significance  of a particular- 
and studiable-scientific community  as the producer  and validator  of knowledge, 
he succeeded in underlining  both the provisional  quality of that knowledge and 
the interactive relationship  between ideas and the precise historical setting of 
their producers.7 Thus he  maintained the  traditional primacy of  intellectual 
structure and change, while maintaining  the need to insert that idea-centered 
concern into a specific historical and disciplinary  context. In doing so he not 
only made the social conditions of innovation more relevant to intellectually 
oriented historians of science, but attracted  the interest of a good many social 
scientists and general historians. It might be argued that Kuhn can hardly be 
construed  as a sociologist in the sense tlfat  the term would have been understood 
in the American  academic community  in the 1960s and early 1970s;  indeed, his 
appeal rested, I think, upon his practical-if  implicit-rejection of accepted so- 
ciological modes of analysis and conventional  subject matters.  His point of view 
could be assimilated  to rather  different  scholarly  traditions,  those of a European- 
5 For some thoughtful  reflections  on this question, see Laurence  Veysey, "The Plural  Organized 
Worlds  of  the  Humanities,"  in  The  Organization  of  Knowledge  in  Modern  America,  1860-1920, 
ed. Alexandra  Oleson and John Voss (Baltimore/London:  Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 
58-63. 
6 Joseph Ben-David,  "Roles and Innovations  in Medicine,"  American  Journal  of Sociology, 1960, 
65:557-568;  Ben-David  and Avraham  Zloczower, "Universities  and Academic Systems in Modem 
Societies,"  European Journal of Sociology,  1962, 3:45-84;  Ben-David,  "Scientific  Productivity  and 
Academic Organization  in Nineteenth Century Medicine," American Sociological Review, 1960, 
25:828-843;  Ben-David  and Randall  Collins, "Social Factors in the Origins  of a New Science: The 
Case of Psychology,  Am. Sociol.  Rev.,  1966, 31:451-465;  Ben-David,  The Scientist's  Role in Society: 
A Comparative  Study (Englewood  Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,  1971). 
7 See the  revised  edition,  Thomas  S.  Kuhn,  The Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions  (2nd.  ed., 
Chicago:  Univ. Press, 1970). The Kuhn "literature"  is voluminous;  for access see Barry Barnes, 
T. S. Kuhn  and Social Science (New York:  Columbia  Univ. Press, 1982);  Nathan  Reingold  "Through 
Paradigm-Land to a Normal  History  of  Science,"  Social  Studies  of Science,  1980, 10:475-496. 
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style sociology of knowledge and an intellectualistic  and priority-oriented  history 
of science; while his method resembled in operational  terms nothing so much 
as the best of established history-department  intellectual  history. Thus the enor- 
mous vogue of Kuhn's work only emphasizes the failure of mainstream  sociol- 
ogy to have engaged the interest of most historians  of science, of whatever ori- 
entation. 
The formalism of the past generation's more standard sociological fare ap- 
pealed neither to those concerned with the internal texture of scientific ideas 
nor to those committed to understanding  the ways in which science fits into 
society. Neither point of view found the empirical work of our sociology de- 
partments  in the 1960s and early 1970s consistently relevant. And that body of 
middle-level  theory and empirical  work has proved in retrospect  a blunt tool for 
the analysis of particular  historical problems. 
Let me note in passing that similar observations might be made about the 
relationship  between science policy and the writing  of the history of science; for 
that body of work describing itself as science policy analysis has exerted even 
less influence on the history of science than its American first cousin, the so- 
ciology of science. Historians  have not been attracted  to a study of policy bereft 
of politics (or history) and of science without ideas. Again neither historians  of 
science concerned with its impact on society nor their peers fascinated by the 
internal  development of scientific ideas have been attracted  by the literature  of 
science policy; even those historians of science who have begun to work on 
twentieth-century  problems and the creation of "big science" have only infre- 
quently assimilated and reflected science policy concerns in their own work. 
Though it was difficult to have predicted two decades ago, the development 
which has had the greatest impact on the study of science in America-on  his- 
torians generally and certainly on the common reader-has  been an extraordi- 
nary efflorescence of interest in the use of scientific ideas and authority  as ide- 
ology and, paralleling  this, a related  interest in the political  and economic impact 
of applied science and medicine. The roots of this phenomenon  are varied, in- 
terrelated, and obvious: the Civil Rights movement, the women's movement, 
environmentalism,  Vietnam. The ideological themes are familiar enough: the 
place of woman as biologically determined, the epistemological legitimacy of 
psychiatric  diagnoses and the social role of psychiatry,  eugenics and racism, the 
nature of intelligence, the role of schools, testing and industrial  psychology in 
the ordering and rationalizing  of society from kindergarten  to the workplace. 
This critical spirit has similarly inspired enthusiastic interest in the social sci- 
ences-and  especially their policy implications. The histories of anthropology, 
sociology, and political science, like the history of psychiatry, have found a new 
constituency, one concerned primarily  with the hegemonic uses made of these 
supposedly value-free  fields. Many of those contributing  to this critical  literature 
have never read Mannheim, Habermas, or Gramsci-but  seem to know per- 
fectly well that they find something insidious in what they see as the interested 
uses made of purportedly  objective ideas. 
A similarly critical spirit has inspired a vigorous body of research into the 
history of the applied sciences and medicine. The relationship  between agri- 
business and agriscience, between industry and high-technology-oriented  edu- 
cation, the economic behavior of physicians and other health providers, have 
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all attracted a growing historical  attention  in the past dozen  years.8 The history 
of technology  has  similarly shown  increasing  signs of moving  closer  and closer 
to  its  neighbors,  business,  social,  and labor history,  and further away  from its 
older allies,  economic  history  and the history  of the physical  sciences. 
I  have  touched  briefly  in describing  this  new  history  on  a good  many  sub- 
stantive  themes.  And this diversity  of subject is paralleled by a diversity  among 
its  practitioners,  many  of  whom  do  not  consider  themselves  historians  of  sci- 
ence-or  even  professional  historians.  As  I  have  implied,  however,  they  are 
bound together by an underlying thematic unity, one that centers on the practical 
and ideological  roles of science  and technology  in perpetuating-and  in part con- 
stituting-a  particular social  order (and in some  versions  assuring the  status  of 
those  keepers  and producers  of  esoteric  knowledge  whose  task  it has  been  to 
defend this social order).9 Knowledge,  the argument follows,  is rarely value free, 
but legitimates  and reflects  the place and thus interests  of those  who employ  it. 
Interest,  of course,  implies structure. This newer generation of students of the 
social  uses  of  science  has been  particularly concerned  to place  knowledge  and 
its keepers  in a hierarchical network of social  relations.  Implicit in this point of 
view  is the assumption  that the ideological  uses  of scientific  ideas and the social 
uses  of  technology  are determined  by  existing  relationships  of  social  and eco- 
nomic  power.  Male  power  expresses  itself  through the  ideas  of  medical  men, 
psychiatrists,  and social  scientists.  White hegemony  expresses  itself through the 
formulations  of  a  racist  biology  and  social  science.  Industrial psychology  was 
created  in response  to the  need  to  rationalize  the workplaces  of industrial cap- 
italism.  Native-born  Americans  expressed  both  their alarm and their power  by 
invoking  the  findings  of  biological  and  social  science  to  explain  the  inferiority 
of  America's  new  immigrants,  finally  legitimating  an  exclusionist  immigration 
policy  in the  1920s.  An  anxious  majority employs  psychiatry  to  stigmatize  the 
deviant. 
Recent  scholarship  has viewed  critically the material products of science  and 
technology  as well  as their ideological  uses.  Even  where  the fruits of  scholarly 
and technical  enterprise  produce  seemingly  useful  goods,  they  tend to be avail- 
able  selectively-as  in  agriculture,  where  the  works  of  applied  science  have 
tended  to  make the rich richer and the poor ex-farmers.  In medicine,  mortality 
and morbidity statistics  still mirror fundamental social inequities-despite  a ther- 
apeutic  armamentarium almost  entirely  reconstituted  in the  past  century.  The 
products  of  industry  seem  in the  works  of  some  recent  students  to  have  been 
calculated  more for the maximization  of consumption  than the rational improve- 
8 See,  e.g.,  David F.  Noble,  America  by Design:  Science,  Technology,  and the Rise of Corporate 
Capitalism  (New  York: Knopf,  1977); E.  Richard Brown,  Rockefeller  Medicine  Men: Medicine  and 
Capitalism  in America  (Berkeley/Los  Angeles:  Univ.  California Press,  1979); Jim Hightower,  Hard 
Tomatoes,  Hard  Times: A Report of the Agribusiness Accountability Project . . . (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Shenkman,  1973). Not  all recent  studies  in this area are marked by  so  critical a spirit.  9 For a particularly heavy-handed  version  of this argument, see  Burton Bledstein,  The Culture of 
Professionalism:  The Middle  Class  and  the  Development  of  Higher  Education  in America  (New 
York:  Norton,  1976).  More  nuanced  and  valuable  studies  dealing  with  the  relationship  between 
knowledge  and the  social  position  of its keepers  and disseminators  are Mary 0.  Furner, Advocacy 
and  Objectivity: A  Crisis  in the  Professionalization  of  American  Social  Science,  1865-1905  (Lex- 
ington: Univ.  Kentucky  Press,  1975); and Thomas L. Haskell,  The Emergence  of Professional  Social 
Science:  The American  Social  Science  Association  and Nineteenth-Century  Crisis of Authority (Ur- 
bana: Univ.  Illinois  Press,  1977). 
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ment of man's lot.10  The past generation of scholars and social critics has, in 
short, firmly placed-indeed  shoved-the  men and ideas of science and its ap- 
plied fields into a world of power and exploitation, of administrative  structure 
and profit maximization,  of historical accident and necessity. 
There are few signs that this interest will flag in the near future. And though 
this trend has in general played a salutary  role in expanding  the history of sci- 
ence canon-certainly  in making it relevant to the concerns of general histori- 
ans-a  few words of caution may be in order. First, indignation  at the inequi- 
table distribution  and often undesirable  uses of technology has in the minds of 
some critics produced an almost categorical  rejection of the new social options 
and equities that scientific and technical change have made possible. Historians 
of the nineteenth and earlier centuries will be very much aware of the realities 
of famine, sickness, infant mortality,  and the brutalizing  effects of want and pre- 
modern  exploitation-the  fundamental  realities of man's condition in traditional 
society. I must confess that I find it difficult to understand  the nostalgic ad- 
miration-shared ironically by some romantics of both left and right-for  the 
spiritually  rewarding  virtues of premodern  village society. 
The ideological uses of science too are more complex and ambiguous than 
some of its recent students would allow. Individual  studies have again and again 
identified socially interested functions played by such ideas; yet a function is 
not the function and function is not meaning. In its most widely used form, the 
term ideology implies structure  and the unequal  exercise of power. At the other 
end of our spectrum  of casual linguistic  usage is the term world view, expressing 
a collectively agreed-upon  and thus collectively valuable way of organizing  so- 
cial reality. Obviously neither of these ends of the value spectrum provides a 
perspective entirely adequate for understanding  the social uses of agreed-upon 
belief, especially in a diverse modern  society. In the future, historians  concerned 
with the ideological  uses of science will have to incorporate  both ways of looking 
at their subject, seeing ideas both as potentially hegemonic and as socially nec- 
essary exercises in collective belief. This is a particularly  challenging  task for 
historians of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries; for our world view- 
irrespective in some ways of class and social location-incorporates scientific 
authority  and scientific descriptions of reality as a fundamental  element. If we 
are to understand  our society's ways of conceptualizing  the world, these for- 
mulations  must be approached  with a due regard  for their diffuseness and mul- 
tivocality. 
For a good many self-identified  historians  of science, however, these problems 
will always remain marginal,  for they relate to the social uses of science and 
not primarily  to scientific ideas and the scientific community. The critical ap- 
proach I have been describing avoids a direct confrontation  with the internal 
logic of scientific ideas and the workings  of the scientific community,  which are, 
after all, the definitive tasks of the historian  of science, technology, or medicine. 
A third, and not entirely unrelated,  trend of the past two decades has been a 
growth of scholarly interests in big science and the foundations, in the role of 
government,  in the knowledge  factories like Caltech  and MIT. Twenty years ago 
10 See,  e.g.,  Stewart  Ewen,  Captains  of  Consciousness:  Advertising  and the Social  Roots  of  the 
Consumer  Culture (New  York: McGraw-Hill,  1976). 
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it was  easier  to find historical  articles  on colonial  botany  than on the  develop- 
ment of biochemistry  or cytology;  a younger  scholar or graduate student today 
is  far  more  likely  to  be  familiar  with  the  career  of  Robert  Millikan,  Warren 
Weaver,  Thomas  Hunt Morgan,  or George  Ellery  Hale  than that of David  Rit- 
tenhouse  or Alexander  Garden.  Though  I would  not  have  us  ignore  our eigh- 
teenth-  and  early-nineteenth-century  roots,  this  shift  in  emphasis  seems  only 
appropriate. Both the scale  and centrality of the twentieth-century  scientific  en- 
terprise  and  the  enticing  availability  of  newly  opened  archival  resources  have 
made recent  science  attractive and highlighted the significance  of support mech- 
anisms for science  and the key role of the scientific  entrepreneur, whether based 
in a university  department or in the  administrative  offices  of  a strategically  lo- 
cated foundation.  The  scale  and specialization  of mid-twentieth-century  science 
has  allowed  us  to  demonstrate  a relationship  between  innovation  and specific, 
documentable  policy  decisions-just  the  sort of finding which  intrigues the his- 
torian and inspires  new  research.11 
This  interest  in recent  science  is  an important and  stable  trend,  one  which 
has  already  reshaped  the  standard canon  of  American  science.  But  it too  has 
exhibited  some  asymmetries  of emphasis.  First,  the availability  of a number of 
strategic  manuscript  collections  has  perpetuated  our natural tendency  to  write 
a  history  of  science  focused  on  cutting  edges  and  elite  organizers,  no  matter 
what the original motivation of the scholar undertaking the study.12 Whether one 
accepts  this as a natural outcome  of the competitive  and intellectualistic  essence 
of  science  or as  a reflection  of  the  necessarily  centralized  nature of  twentieth- 
century  decision-making,  it  nevertheless  results  in  a  partialistic  canon,  one 
weighted  toward  trend-setting  subdisciplines  and  a handful of  key  institutions 
and decision  makers.  But these  are relatively  minor cavils;  it is clear that in the 
institutional  growth  and  social  impact  of  science  in twentieth-century  America 
we have a set of problems that will keep historians at work for generations.  And 
like the burgeoning interest  in the ideological  uses  of science,  this concern  with 
contemporary  science  and its modes  of  support inevitably  brings the history  of 
science  closer  to the concerns  of general historians; to some extent this has been 
the case  with Kuhn's  influence  and the desire to explore  professionalization;  all 
have  helped  create  an increasing  rapprochement  between  historians  of  science 
and technology  and the larger field  of history. 
Thus far I have  been  broadly  sketching  some  paths explored  during the  past 
generation.  By  way  of  conclusion  let  me  suggest-and  perhaps  predict-some 
directions  for the next  two  decades. 
First,  we  have  hardly solved  the problem of  relating scientific  ideas  and the 
structure of the scientific  community to their extrascientific  context.  Though this 
area has been the occasion  for an abundance of programmatic statements,  it has 
1l For 20th-century  biochemistry,  see  Robert  Kohler,  From Medical  Chemistry to Biochemistry: 
The Making  of  a  Biomedical  Discipline  (Cambridge: Cambridge  Univ.  Press,  1982); and  Kohler, 
"Warren Weaver  and the Rockefeller  Foundation  Program in Molecular  Biology:  A Case  Study  in 
the Management of Science,"  in The Sciences  in the American Context, ed. Nathan Reingold (Wash- 
ington,  D.C.:  Smithsonian  Institution Press,  1979), pp. 249-293.  For 20th-century American physics 
see,  e.g.,  Daniel  Kevles,  The Physicists  (New  York: Knopf,  1977); Robert Kargon, Robert Millikan 
(Ithaca: Cornell  Univ.  Press,  1982). 
12 The availability of the Rockefeller  Archives  Collection  provides  a particularly striking example. 
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been  a somewhat  less  fruitful source  of  empirical investigation.13 (At the  same 
time,  the problem has come  to seem  increasingly  complex  as work on the twen- 
tieth  century  has  made  clear  the  diversity  of  such  interrelationships).  One  en- 
couraging  trend  is  a  growing  interest  in  the  disciplinary  approach;  as  I  have 
suggested  elsewhere,  the discipline-or  in the twentieth century increasingly the 
sub-subdiscipline  or problem  cluster-is  the  structuring unit of  intellectual  ac- 
tivity,  the entity organically incorporating intellectual,  institutional, and personal 
elements  in shaping the  reality  perceived  and experienced  by  individual  scien- 
tists.  Such thought-defined  units are ordinarily understood and accepted  by con- 
temporaries,  not  imposed  by  the  historian's  retrospective  concerns.14 Though 
one  may differ about the mechanisms  producing innovation,  one  can hardly ap- 
proach  even  a problem  in the  history  of  pure mathematics  or physics  in  1982 
without  at  least  a  gesture-in  the  direction  of  placing  one's  protagonists  in  a 
generation  and discipline-specific  framework.  These  are realities  which  no past 
actor could  well  have  ignored. 
Which suggests  another important and perhaps underappreciated approach to 
relating the  scientists'  ideas  to  the  context  in which  he  or she  develops  them. 
And this  is  implied by  my use  of  the  term  "actor"  and centers  on tracing the 
scientist  through his or her life course  as he or she chooses  among a particular 
configuration of social,  institutional,  and intellectual  options.  A key problem,  of 
course,  lies  in selecting  appropriate units  of  analysis.  One,  obviously,  is  indi- 
vidual biography; another is the collective  biography of small groups,  especially 
those  defined  by  a  commonality  of  intellectual  commitment  and  institutional 
location. 
Biography,  a somewhat  less  than fashionable  genre,  deserves  a word  of  de- 
fense  and explication.15 What could be a more organic and unassailably coherent 
sample of historical  data than a man's life? Although every  life is idiosyncratic, 
no  life  is  random;  every  life  course  reflects  a  specific  configuration  of  social 
options-those  chosen,  as well by implication as those  unavailable or unchosen. 
To follow  the choices  made by a particular actor is necessarily  to transcend the 
sterile  categories  of  internal and external,  social  or intellectual.  Let  me  refer, 
by  way  of  illustration,  to  a  particularly  well  known,  if  not  notorious,  recent 
example-the  life  of J. B.  Watson  as  presented  in his  Double  Helix:  when  the 
self-consciously  eager  young  man  decides  how  he  is  to  invest  his  intellectual 
capital in making a career, is he making an institutional or an intellectual choice? 
13 For a sophisticated  guide to work in this area,  see  Steven  Shapin,  "History  of  Science  and its 
Sociological Reconstructions,"  Hist.  Sci.,  1982, 20:157-211. See also Barry Barnes and Steven Shapin, 
eds.,  Natural  Order: Historical  Studies  of  Scientific  Culture (Beverly  Hills/London:  Sage,  1979); 
Barry Barnes,  Interests  and  the  Growth of  Knowledge  (London:  Routledge  & Kegan  Paul,  1977). 
14 Gerard Lemaine,  Roy Macleod,  Michael Mulkay, and Peter Weingart, eds.,  Perspectives  on the 
Emergence  of  Scientific  Disciplines  (The  Hague:  Mouton,  1976); Russell  H.  McCormmach,  "Edi- 
tor's Foreword,"  Historical  Studies in the Physical  Sciences,  1971, 3:ix-xxiv;  Kohler, From Medical 
Chemistry, Ch. I.,  "Introduction:  On Discipline  History,"  pp. 1-8; David Edge and Michael Mulkay, 
Astronomy  Transformed: The Emergence  of Radio Astronomy  in Britain (New  York: Wiley,  1976); 
Rosenberg,  "On The Study of American Biology  and Medicine";  Darryl Chubin, "State of the Field: 
The  Conceptualization  of  Scientific  Specialties,"  Sociological  Quarterly,  1976, 17:448-476;  Ronald 
C. Tobey,  Saving  the Prairies:  The Life Cycle of the Founding  School  of American  Plant  Ecology, 
1895-1955  (Berkeley/Los  Angeles:  Univ.  California Press,  1981). 
15 For a recent  discussion,  see  Thomas  L.  Hankins,  "In  Defence  of  Biography: The  Use  of  Bi- 
ography in the  History  of  Science,"  Hist.  Sci.,  1979, 17:1-16. 
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To pose  such alternatives is to underline their arbitrariness. Every man or woman 
of  intellect  is both  a more or less  competent  and original practitioner of  his or 
her  discipline  and  at  the  same  time  a  navigator  among  a  generation  specific 
structure of  options.16  The  same  considerations  apply,  of  course,  to  any group 
small enough  to  share a problem-defined  identity. 
I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  study  of  the  scientist's  life  course  is  easily 
accomplished  or,  more significantly,  that when  accomplished  it provides  a sim- 
ple  and well-marked  road to  historical  understanding.  This  approach does  not 
guarantee  answers,  but  it does  provide  an inclusive  way  of  framing questions 
and ordering data; it is an approach that necessarily  includes social,  institutional, 
and intellectual  factors  in a structured context.  A life as  lived  is  a particularly 
valuable  sampling device  for the historian; for life is not a seamless  web  of ex- 
perience,  but can be examined  at significant points  in time,  moments  which  in- 
evitably  present  particular  configurations  of  social  possibility.  In  Wilhelmian 
Germany,  for example,  an individual's  class  and religion  (as well  as other fac- 
tors) played a role from birth on in determining the likelihood of that individual's 
embarking upon an academic  career. Entrance into secondary  school  constituted 
another point  at which  decisions  were  made and a new  set of prospective  like- 
lihoods  defined.  The  choices  for a  student  in a classical  Gymnasium  were  ob- 
viously  different from those  available  to his age-mate  in a Realschule.  Later in 
a scientist's  life,  more  specifically  academic  choices  had to be made-of  disci- 
pline,  of  thesis  adviser,  of  dissertation  subject,  of first employment.  And each 
choice  can  be  seen  as  having  been  made  among  a particular configuration  of 
options-while  determining to  some  extent  an individual's  future choices. 
It is  true that history  may  legitimately  ask  its  practitioners  to  transcend  the 
time-bound perceptions  of those  past actors who  constitute  its scholarly  subject 
matter; basic  social  patterns may well  elude the understanding of even  the most 
perceptive  living  through them and fundamental  social  change  may at times  be 
imperceptible  to  those  experiencing  it.  On the  other  hand,  it is  the  historian's 
unavoidable  task  to  understand  time-  and  culture-bound  perceptions  and  as- 
sumptions,  and at the  same  time  to  place  his  actor's  perception  in more  gen- 
eral-exterior-terms.  Historians  have to perform two different tasks: to see the 
past in the same terms as those  who lived in it, yet at the same time stand apart 
from those  perceptions  and evaluate  their implications  for the functioning  of  a 
social  system  or  the  initiation  of  change  in  that  system.  In  this  collective 
enterprise,  the  ability  to  follow  individuals  and small groups  through their life 
course  is an indispensable  tool.  Historians  of science  should-and  I hope will- 
undertake  such  studies  in ever-increasing  numbers. 
I have  already  suggested  a second  trend that will certainly  continue  to thrive 
in the near future,  and that is the still-burgeoning interest in the ideological  uses 
of  science.  It is  unlikely  that this  problem  will  be  ignored; it is  too  central  to 
our culture.  It is equally  obvious  that we  will continue  to have a steady  growth 
16 J. D. Watson,  The Double  Helix: A Personal  Account  of the Discovery  of the Structure of DNA 
(New York:  Atheneum,  1968).  For an ingenious  use of the biographical  form  as an expository  device, 
treating  a particular  disciplinary  group, see Russell McCormmach,  Night Thoughts  of a Classical 
Physicist (Cambridge/London:  Harvard  Univ. Press, 1982). I have discussed the historical  uses of 
an approach  emphasizing  the structure  of social options  in "History  and Experience,"  in The  Family 
in History, ed. Charles  Rosenberg  (Philadelphia:  Univ. Pennsylvania  Press, 1975),  pp. 1-11. 
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of  work  in twentieth-century  science,  especially  its  support  structures  and re- 
lationships  to the applied sectors.  Academics  live in a world of government  sub- 
ventions,  of  foundations,  of  problematic  relationships  with  industry;  as  these 
realities  force  themselves  upon even  the most  cloistered  consciousness  we  can 
hardly expect  our students  to ignore them.  The interest  in the place  of  science 
in American  society  can only increase  with the everyday  impact of that science. 
Our generation's  crisis  in work and technology,  in environmental  pollution  and 
energy resources,  our struggles over military procurement,  our attempts to cope 
with the  information revolution  have  become  staples  of  social  and political  de- 
bate  at  almost  every  level  of  society.  They  will  soon  become  staples  in  our 
doctoral  seminars and then in the pages  of dissertation  abstracts and our schol- 
arly journals. 
The  last few  decades  have  underlined ways  in which  science  has functioned 
as  ideology;  but we  must  live  with  the  fact  that it is  more  than that.  Science 
and technology  have produced  both the hard tomatoes  we  encounter  every  day 
in our supermarkets and the hydrogen bombs that recur in our nightmares. The 
ideas  and authority of  science  and technology  are not mere mystification;  they 
have created the possibility  of new  social  choices  even  if they do not determine 
how  these  choices  are to be exercised. 
I have been  asked occasionally  why we need a peculiar field of the history of 
science;  and the  discipline,  if such  it is,  does  threaten on occasion  to  polarize 
terminally and recrystallize  into a social history,  on the one hand, indistinguish- 
able from social  history  generally  and, on the other,  into an intellectual  history 
reflecting  the  several  competences  of  contemporary  scientists.  But  this  would 
hardly  be  a  desirable  state  of  things.  The  peculiarly  hybrid  and  increasingly 
eclectic  character  of  the  history  of  science  is  its  most  convincing  reason  for 
being.  Without a specialized  understanding of scientific  ideas,  historians can un- 
derstand neither the social  choices  created by science  nor the community  within 
which  these  new  ideas  are elaborated.  Obviously,  as  well,  there  is  a place  for 
largely  or even  exclusively  internalist  studies;  for they  reflect  significant  intel- 
lectual  questions  and  emotional  commitments.  Similarly,  there  will  always  be 
an important place  for the  increasingly  sophisticated  study  of  the  social  forms 
and social  impact  of  science  and technology.  But it is  the peculiar  task  of  the 
discipline  of the history  of  science  as a collective  enterprise  to constitute,  rep- 
resent,  and synthesize  all these points of view-perhaps  not so much in the work 
of particular individuals,  as in the aggregate of many such  individual efforts. 
In some ways,  as I have argued, the disjunction between  internal and external 
remains the historian of  science's  central continuing dilemma; for it transcends 
intradisciplinary  problems  of  status  and  intellectual  conflict  and represents  in 
microcosm  more  general  social  disjunctions  which  have  become  oppressively 
apparent in the past generation.  The  social  understanding of  science  is too  im- 
portant  to  be  left  to  the  scientists;  and  we  cannot  have  a  history  of  science 
without that science.  The categorical distinction between  ideas and behavior may 
be useful  in some  areas of historical analysis,  but it makes precious  little  sense 
in an arena where ideas and writings are fundamental behaviors.  The acts of the 
mind are  still  acts,  and  in  this  case  acts  with  consequences  vast  and  still  un- 
determined. 
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